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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LYNN D. PAUL and ANITA K. PAUL,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 13968

MABLE S. KITT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS LYNN D. PAUL AND ANITA K. PAUL

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Respondents, as Buyers, brought suit for specific
performance against Defendant-Appellant, as Seller, for breach
of a real estate sales contract and for attorneys fees. DefendantAppellant, the Seller, counterclaimed alleging default and fraud,
and mailed a notice as basis for unlawful detainer or forfeiture.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE TRIAL COURT
Judgment was entered in favor of the Buyers directing
specific performance of the contract by the Seller and awarding
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.
the Buyers
$500.00
damages
forLibrary,
attorneys
fees
incurred.
The damages
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

were credited on the contract payments. The counterclaim was dis~

!

missed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
i

Plaintiffs-Respondents request the judgment of the trial
i

court be affirmed.
MEMORANDUM
References to "Tr." pertain to the numbered pages in the
transcript. References to "R." pertain to the indicated pages of
record. References to Plaintiff's exhibits are shown by "P-" and
Defendant's exhibits are shown by "D-" preceding the number of the
exhibit.
•

*

*

*

*

*

*

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 7, 1972, the Plaintiffs-Respondents in this
action, herein referred to as Buyers, executed a contract to purchase real estate from the Defendant-Appellant and her then-living
husband, John Maynard Kitt, herein referred to as Seller (Ex. P-10).
This contract required a down-payment of $480.00 with $50.00 or
more to be paid on or before the first day of each month succeeding
April 1, 1972. The payments were to be applied first to interest
and subsequently to principal. Payments were made by the Buyers
and accepted by the Seller until March 25, 1974, at which time the
Buyers mailed the March payment in the form of a money order on the
Bank of Salt Lake No. 35775 (Ex. P-l and Tr. 41). Said payment,
though Digitized
late bybythe 25
days*
was
within
theSchool,
30-day
Howard
W. Hunter
Lawmailed
Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
BYU. period allowed
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under Paragraph 16 of the aforementioned contract.

This money order

was mailed to Mable Kitt, 7821 South 3500 East at Sandy, Utah, or
Salt Lake City, Utah, which City was uncertain.

The January and

February, 1974, payments were addressed to Mable Kitt, 7321 South
3500 East, Sandy, Utah, and were delivered (Tr. 21 and Ex. D-24 and
D-25).

In either case, the correct street and number of 7821 South

3500 East were used.

Apparently, in such cases, the post office

either returns the letter to the sender or corrects the Sandy City
to read Salt Lake City and then delivers the letter (Tr. 21).
Defendant-Appellant claims this money order was never
received by her. On April 3, 1974, the Seller sent a letter to the
Buyers which stated she terminated the contract and repossessed
the lot.

Said letter states:
Salt Lake City, Utah
April 3, 1974
Mr. Lynn and Anita Paul:
I hereby notify you of the termination of
your contract on Lot 204, Honeywood Hills II,
for lack of payment on same.
I am taking possession of said Lot under
Option One of the contract you signed. Refer
to your contract for information.
Respectfully yours,
Mable S. Kitt
7821 South 3500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
LaRhea Kitt Walton
Linda Spencer Kitt
(Ex. P-ll)
This letter was received by Plaintiffs-Respondents on

April 4, 1974 (Ex. D-26).
On Friday, April 5, 1974, Buyers purchased a $50.00 money
order No.
36892
(Ex. W.
P-5).
This
mailed
Digitized
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1974, by the post office marked "Return to Sender."
On April 16, 1974, Buyers1 attorney remailed the April 5th
money order to the Seller by certified mail properly addressed (Ex.
P-18).

Included with the money order was a letter which explained

the loss of the March 25th payment plus the fact that a tracer on
the lost payment was being placed by the post office. The letter
states in part, "If-the money order cannot be found, they will have
the bank stop-payment and will issue a duplicate payment to you by
the end of April, 1974" (Ex. P-18).

This payment was returned by

the Seller.

-

On May 1, 1974, Plaintiffs-Respondents1 counsel mailed
Defendant-Appellant two $50.00 money orders. Honey Order No. 37124
was a replacement for the lost money order dated March 25th (Ex. P-4).
Money Order No. 37116 was intended to be the Hay, 1974, installment
(Ex. P-7). Included with these two payments was a letter from the
Buyers1 counsel which states in part, "Mr. and Mrs. Lynn Paul herewith offer to pay the net balance of the contract in exchange for a
warranty deed'1 (Ex. P-19).
On May 31, 1974, another Money Order Mo. 37406 (Ex. P-9) was
purchased and sent to Mrs. Kitt properly addressed.

Each money order

mentioned was returned to Buyers by the Seller as soon as it was
received except the May 31st money order which was returned to the
Court by the Seller at the time of the hearing.
On May 17, 1974, Buyers filed suit for specific performance,
and Seller counterclaimed for cancellation of the purchase contract
or presumably an unlawful detainer counterclaim and for fraud. The
trial court, Judge James S. Sawaya, decreed specific performance,
awarded attorneys fees, and dismissed the counterclaim.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Seller

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO
DIRECT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
Buyers were not in default at the time Seller sent a notice
of termination of the contract. Buyers had purchased and mailed on
March 25, 1974, a money order for the March installment. The receipt
issued by the bank for said money order was admitted into evidence and
the testimony concerning the fact that it was mailed was uncontroverted.
Use of the mail for payments was the accepted custom (Tr. 33).
March 25th was within the 30-day period allowed by the Uniform Real
Estate Contract under Paragraph 16. Seller contends that this installment was never received by her. As a result, from her point of
view, it may have appeared that a default had occurred, thus her
concern is understandable. What cannot be understood is the belligerant
attitude taken by the Seller after she had received not only an explanation of the lost payment but the assurance that a duplicate would
be issued no later than the end of April, 1974, if the lost payment
were not found by then. In the meantime, all payments were kept
current.
The Buyers testified that their relations with the Seller
were amicable. This seems to be confirmed by the testimony of Mrs.
Kitt concerning a delinquency which occurred in November and December,
1973 (Tr. 62-63). This testimony indicates an amicable attitude
between the parties. The Seller accepted those two late payments,
which indicated Seller would not be so technically strict.
Acceptance of late installment payments without termination of
the purchaser's rights under the contract has been considered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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default in timely payments, at least in the absence of reasonable

f
i

notice that the vendor would thereafter demand strict compliance
with the terms of the contract.

55 A.L.R. (3d) 39.

Hill v. Taylor, (1970) 285 Ala. 612, 235 So. (2d) 647.

|
'

.

In this case the court held that the failure of the purchaser to
make a monthly payment on time did not justify a determination that

I

the delayed tender of installment constituted a default or work a
forfeiture.

I

In the case of Kings ley v. Roeder, (1954) 2 111. (2d) 131,

I

117 N.E. (2d) 82, the court took the position that once the seller
had waived the provisions as to strict compliance with the payment
requirements they were required to give the purchaser adequate advance
notice that strict compliance with the payment requirements would

•

henceforth be requiredi and that where the sellers made no diligent

I

effort to serve such a notice upon the purchasers, they were precluded
from declaring the contract forfeited by the mere fact that the

|

installment payments were sent a month or two late.

.

It is common knowledge that the street numbering system
1n the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area uses South Temple and Main Street

'
I

as the central point and basically the streets are numbered with
reference to this point, quite like the geological survey system of

-|

designating Township and Range (i.e., T2S, R3E, etc.). The suburbs

i

around Salt Lake City proper are not well defined by boundary, but
an address such as 7821 South 3500 East is significant to the post
office, especially with the zip code 04121 added (Ex. P-25).
Since any delay caused by addressing to "Sandy" could only

I

result in potential problems, no rational motivation, such as Seller

|
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and Sandy City (Tr. 20)- This type of mistake or inadvertence
does not attain the degree of gravity to justify an inequitable
forfeiture for a possible "technical default" on a contract.

This

is especially true in view of the promise to issue a duplicate
money order at the end of April should the lost installment not be
found*
Under the extenuating circumstances of the case at bar,
it would be unconscionable to adjudge a forfeiture. This court has
announced the equitable policy or rule in Utah as follows:
Weyher v. Peterson, (1965) 16 U.2d 278, 399 P.2d
438. By common practice in Utah, an action in
unlawful detainer may be brought against a vendee
of realty v/hen payments are far in arrears, after
sufficient demands for payment have been made and
subsequent notice to quit has been given by the
vendor; and where a vendor does cancel the contract for sale and bring such an action, vendee
may be required, if the contract so provides,
to forfeit as liquidated damages all money theretofore paid to the vendor along with all improvements placed on the land by the vendee, unless
such forfeiture would be unconscionable. (Emphasis
added.)
Seller claims that at no time did the Buyers tender more
than a portion of the delinquency, yet Mrs. Kitt said she would
not have accepted three payments at one time (Tr. 63-64).

When the

April 5th payment was mailed while the March 25th installment was
still lost, the contract may be considered current by applying that
payment for March. The Seller v/as given a full explanation and
Buyers promised to issue a duplicate March payment.

In view of the

facts, Buyers were taking reasonable precautions to protect the lost
payment.

Since Seller assumes nothing but the worst of intentions

on the part of the Buyers, conversely, the Buyers might legitimately
be allowed to assume that the lost payment had been received by Mrs.
Kitt who
simply
refused
to Law
cash
itJ. Reuben
in order
establish
a phony
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Library,
Clark Lawto
School,
BYU.
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justification for repossession of the lot (Tr. 51-52).

In view of

this possibility, Mr. and Mrs. Paul acted reasonably in taking the
precautions they did.

Once the tracer did not find the lost payment,

a duplicate was issued.
By the end of April or first of May, 1974, Seller was in
receipt of all "delinquencies."

No effort was made to retender for

the third time the rejected April 5th payment (Ex. P-8) which was
last mailed on April 16, 1974 (Tr. 63). It was at this time that
the offer to pay the remaining balance on the contract was made in
lieu of retendering the rejected April payment.
Defendant-Appellant cites Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 U.
2d 47,513 P.2d 417 (1973), for the proposition that the Seller is
entitled to have delinquencies paid in full.

In the case at bar,

the Buyers tendered the "delinquent" payments during April and May
(Tr. 41, 42, 43).
The central issue in Corporation Nine was whether prior
deviations by both parties from a plan of sale established in a
contract for sale of land justified later deviations from the contract.

Because of the deviation, the Buyer simply stood upon the

position that it had tendered full performance. This ^tender and
refusal was the heart of the controversy.
The Buyer in Corporation Nine cited the following cases,
and Plaintiffs-Respondents in the case at bar also invite the Court's
attention to these cases for the principle that forfeitures are not
favored:

Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P. 2d 673 (1971);

Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P. 2d 446 (1952); Malmberg v.
Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923).
The Court then made this comment:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We agree that in the situation of the usual real
estate contract, and perhaps even in this one,
the five day notice to perform might be unreasonable and arbitrary if a more reasonable
and longer time would have been of any benefit
to the buyer.
Defendant-Appellant cites Fuhriman v. Bissegger, 13 U.
2d 379, 375 P. 2d 27 (1962), for the proposition that the purchaser
must pay all amounts due into the court. Such method of payment
is only one possible consideration for a given case. The court
did not infer that this method must be used in all cases. The
court might just as easily have ordered payments to be made to an
escrow, as Buyers in the case at bar suggested at the conclusion
of the trial. Since there is more than one equitable method to
remedy controversies of this nature, the Fuhriman case certainly
does not hold that the money must be paid in to the Court in all
cases as the condition for specific performance.
POINT II
THE NOTICE SENT TO PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS BY DEFENDANTAPPELLANT IS WHOLLY INADEQUATE.
Accepting Seller's argument that Buyers were in default,
simply for the sake of discussion, it can be seen that the April 3rd
notice sent to Buyers is wholly inadequate for the purpose intended.
It does not give the Buyers a reasonable chance to inquire into the
alleged default nor does it give five days to correct an alleged
default. The letter states definitively that Seller has terminated
the contract and is taking possession. It is implied that the
reference to the contract contained in the letter speaks indirectly
to the five-day period in which to remedy. This argument is countered
by the unequivocal statement that the contract is terminated.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, may contain errors.
However, a $50.00 Machine-generated
payment (money
order) (Ex. P-3) was obtained on

Friday, April 5th* and mailed April 9, 1974.
In the case of Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, (1943) 113
U. 403, 195 P. 2d 743, this Court held that acceptance by vendor
of purchaser's past due payments under a uniform real estate contract, and other conduct leading the Buyer to believe that strict
performance would not be required by vendor, imposes a duty on
vendor to give purchaser a reasonable notice before vendor may
insist on strict performance by purchaser.
Defendant-Appellant, by way of an inaccurate citation,
cites the case of Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d 699 (1934).
It is felt that this case is distinguishable from the case at bar
for several reasons.

First, there was no question as to the Buyer's

default in that case. The default existed and was not challenged.
Second, the central issue in that case, contrary to the case at
bar, was whether the forfeiture clause contained in the land sale
contract was self-executing or not.

If the clause stated that Buyer's

default made the contract null and void, then no notice of an election
of forfeiture need be sent by the seller to the buyer.
words, the contract would be self-executing.

In other

As is stated in 94

A.L.R. 1232, at 1245, no such notice is necessary in the absence
of a statute requiring such, unless the contract is to be interpreted
as requiring it.

In speaking of the Leone case in particular, the

annotation explains that the contract there in question did not provide for the giving of written notice of forfeiture.

It did say,

however, that the vendor u at his option" could respond to a default
in several different ways-

The Court held that until the vendor

exercises his election to forfeit by notice given to the vendee a
suit for forfeiture and possession by the vendor would not lie.
— •. _

/s
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the vendee an explanation of what result his default would have,
since the contract itself did not give such an explanation. The
Court was aided in its decision by the unlawful detainer statute 1n
force at that time (R.S. Utah 1933, 104-60-3). This statute varies
greatly from that presently in effect, which constitutes another
distinction between the two cases. The final distinction stems from
the fact that a uniform real estate contract was not involved there
as it Is in the case presented now. (Emphasis added.)
In the Fuhriman case (supra) cited by Seller, the Court
recognized the right of a purchaser under an installment land contract to specific performance notwithstanding default in timely
payment of installments. The decision v/as based upon a determination
"that forfeiture of the purchaser's rights was barred by the failure
of the vendor to comply with provision of the contract ... governing
notice requirements with respect to termination and forfeiture of the
rights of the purchaser."
In the Fuhriman case, the purchaser had defaulted in making
payments on a contract for the sale of real estate for many years.
An action was brought by the vendor to evict under a clause like
Paragraph 16a in the contract at bar. Purchaser counterclaimed for
specific performance. The Court held, in part, that vendor had failed
to notify purchaser that unless payments were made within a reasonable
time, there would be a forfeiture of the agreement. Just as in the
case at bar, Seller tried repossession without a notice of the time
period to remedy the default.
POINT III
THE DAMAGE AWARD IS REASONABLE AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
EVIDENCE.
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Defendant-Appellant cites F.M.A. Financial Corporation
v. Build, Inc., 17 U. 2d 80, 404 P. 2d 670 (1965), for the proposition
that damages or attorneys fees must be supported by evidence and
not a promise to pay an attorney.

In the case at bar, testimony

was given as to the obligation which Plaintiffs-Respondents incurred
to their attorney as a result of the actions taken by Mrs. Kitt
(Tr. 44-45).

The case cited states that attorneys fees to the

Plaintiffs were awarded "without an^ evidence or stipulation in
the record with respect thereto."
The attempt was made in the last cited case to justify
the award by an "advisory schedule of fees and charges" only. The
reason for the Supreme Court's holding denying attorneys fees is
obvious and distinguishable from the case at bar. At no point does
that case state that a promise to pay an attorney given as testimony
in open court is insufficient evidence of such item of damages.
There was no contention in our case that the fee was unreasonable.
The trial court in the case at bar found from the evidence (Tr. 44)
and not from a suggested schedule of fees that the Pauls had incurred
$500.00 attorneys fees and awarded this as damages (R. 34, Para. 4)
(R. 44, Para. 2 ) .
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court properly
ordered specific performance and denied the counterclaim; that said
judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Gregory C Diamond
George C. Morris
MORRIS S ROBINSON
520 Kearns Building
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